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Bad, mad, sad or rational actor? Why the
‘securitization’ paradigm makes for poor policy
analysis of north Korea*
International Affairs 76, 3 (2000) 593-617
HAZEL SMITH
The analysis of north Korea’s domestic and foreign politics is now something
of a cottage industry—partly because more data are available than ever before
and partly because the fear of military conflict on the Korean peninsula has
focused minds and attention on this last Cold War arena of tension.1 The data
comes from the now numerous humanitarian organizations that have been
resident in Pyongyang since the start of the food emergency in 1995 as well as
from the literally hundreds of political and humanitarian delegations that have
visited the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in that period.2
Fear of conflict arises from unresolved tensions generated through the
DPRK’s suspected nuclear armaments programme and continues because of
persistent international antagonism to the continuation of the DPRK’s long-
range missile development plans.3
There are different strands to the scholarly and policy analysis of north
Korean politics but the dominant approach, and that which permeates the
media coverage of the DPRK, remains heavily coloured by a security
perspective which is, among other things, curiously old-fashioned in its reliance
upon the use and potential of military force as the central analytical notion in
foreign policy behaviour.4 This dominant approach shapes much more than
* This is a final, revised version of an article erroneously published in the January 2000 issue of International
Affairs.
1 Some of the more useful literature includes Young Whan Kihl, ed., Korea and the world: beyond the Cold
War (Oxford: Westview, 1994); Han S. Park, ed., North Korea: Ideology, politics, economy (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1996); Hazel Smith, Chris Rhodes, Diana Pritchard and Kevin Magill, eds,
North Korea in the new world order (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); Keun Lee, ‘The road to the market in
North Korea: projects, problems and prospects’, Working Paper no. 139 (Helsinki: United Nations
University World Institute for Development Economics Research, Aug. 1997); Samuel S. Kim, ed.,
North Korean foreign relations in the post-Cold War era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Dae-Sook
Suh and Chae-Jin Lee, eds, North Korea after Kim Il Sung (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Marcus
Noland, ed., Economic integration of the Korean Peninsula (Washington DC: Institute for International
Economics, Jan. 1998); David Reese, The prospects for North Korea’s survival, Adelphi Paper no. 323
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998).
2 For discussion of the presence of the humanitarian community in north Korea, see Hazel Smith, ‘“Open-
ing up” by default: North Korea, the humanitarian community and the crisis’, Pacific Review 12: 3, 1999.
3 For detailed reporting of these concerns, see the almost daily bulletins from the excellent website at
<http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/index.html>.
4 For a more sophisticated security studies approach, see the seminal contribution of Barry Buzan, People,
states and fear, 2nd edn (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).
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analysis of straightforwardly security issues such as the threat of war, military
policy, the potential use of both nuclear weapons and what are today known as
weapons of mass destruction (WMD); it also forms the framework within
which economic, welfare and humanitarian issues are conceived. In other
words, these last issues are securitized. For this reason, I want to term this
perspective the ‘securitizing framework’—and I want to argue that there are
two sets of fundamental assumptions shaping this perspective. The first can be
encapsulated by the image of the DPRK as ‘bad’; and it is often complemented
by the second, a vision of north Korea as ‘mad’.
In this article I discuss how this paradigm shapes perceptions both of the
DPRK and of the policy options open to the international community. I then
evaluate the problems faced by international (humanitarian and other) policy-
makers who have had to deal directly with the DPRK since the emergence of
the food crisis in 1995 and whose frame of reference was, inevitably, shaped by
this dominant perspective; and go on to evaluate the alternatives to the
securitization paradigm, drawing on the experience of the elements of the
international community that have been engaged with and in the DPRK since
1995. I trace two analytic alternatives, which I will call the ‘sad’ and the ‘rational
actor’ perspectives.
I argue that the ‘sad’ category provides some illumination of DPRK policy
and behaviour, but that the rational actor perspective is more fruitful in that it
can assimilate the anomalies thrown up by the securitization perspective and,
further, that it is able to offer a more appropriate base for policy analysis than the
‘mad or bad’ approach. This is so because it makes visible aspects of DPRK
politics and behaviour which are obscured or made absent by the dominant
paradigm. At the same time, the rational actor approach eschews the normative
commitment entailed by the securitization paradigm, which views the regime as
outside the international community of liberal capitalist states and which,
implicitly or explicitly, holds the only solution to the ‘Korean problem’ to be
the eradication of the DPRK regime. While that option may provide one
answer, it is self-defeating in that it promotes what it ostensibly seeks to deny:
namely, arms-racing behaviour and a belligerent attitude to the international
community on the part of the DPRK.
I do not argue that the bad, mad, sad or rational actor approaches are
mutually exclusive, but simply that they offer analytic alternatives for thinking
about the DPRK. I argue, however, that alternative paradigmatic choices may
help policy analysis towards more nuanced policy choices.
Kuhnian paradigms and north Korean politics: what’s the connection?
Although the once pervasive epistemological notion of ‘paradigms’ has become
a pretty old-fashioned idea in social science, it provides a useful analytical
framework for the discussion here because it helps in the evaluation of how some-
times ‘irrational’ and often unexamined assumptions shape research questions
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and research outcomes.5 The Kuhnian argument is that within a scientific
community dominant conceptual frameworks, which Kuhn calls paradigms, are
constituted by sets of fundamental (that is, unquestioned) assumptions. A
successful paradigm is one whose fundamental assumptions continue for some
length of time to provide a fruitful base for problem-solving. Such assumptions
are held to be true for as long as they consistently help solve research puzzles.
Paradigmatic assumptions, by their nature, do not have to be either proved or
falsified and can therefore be thought of as pre-theoretical.
Paradigms are incommensurable with one another. Scholars working within
the confines of one conceptual framework simply cannot directly communicate
with scholars utilizing alternative paradigms. They literally ‘see’ different things,
with paradigms acting as a kind of scientific filtering or selection mechanism
which decides what is significant or important, prior to analysis taking place. Kuhn
argues that paradigms can cope with anomalies, including facts that do not ‘fit’
the framework, but that they fall into ‘crisis’ when there are simply too many
anomalies for the paradigm to continue to be persuasive. Kuhn argues that after
crises we sometimes see a ‘paradigm shift’ or a ‘revolution’ in which the
dominant paradigm is replaced by an alternative which is more successful in
puzzle-solving.
The intriguing and controversial nature of Kuhn’s approach is its insistence
that paradigms are sociological as well as purely rational constructs. At its
crudest, the paradigm is true because the community of researchers believes it to
be true. When they cease believing, the paradigm ceases to provide an accept-
able scientific framework for analysis.6 This does not mean, however, that any
arbitrarily chosen set of assumptions can replace the previous paradigm. Paradigms
do not arise as if by magic. There must be an alternative available, perhaps based
on a body of research which, although starting from within the dominant
paradigm, repeatedly throws up conclusions which, precisely because they do
not fit paradigmatic assumptions, are ignored or sidelined by the broader
scientific community. Paradigm change is not a common occurrence, however.
This is because dominant paradigms are powerful and can last for longer than
their apparent utility might warrant.
Given the Kuhnian framework, therefore, the argument in the present context
would run as follows. The securitization paradigm for interpreting north
Korean politics may have once been fruitful—for instance, during the Cold
5 For the ‘paradigmatic’ work see Thomas S. Kuhn, The structure of scientific revolutions, 2nd edn (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970).
6 Kuhn has been criticized for allegedly advocating the idea that scientific judgement is not strictly
‘rational’, and also for ‘relativism’. The debate is in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds, Criticism and
the growth of knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Kuhn has refuted these criticisms
in a postscript to The structure of scientific revolutions, 2nd edn, pp. 174–210. Irrespective of this debate,
Kuhn’s work has had an enormous influence on social science and international relations theory,
implicitly and explicitly shaping the debates of the last fifteen years. See for instance Michael Banks, ‘The
inter-paradigm debate’, in Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom, eds, International relations: a handbook of
current theory (London: Pinter, 1985).
76_3_11_Smith 13/6/00, 4:50 pm595
Hazel Smith

War—and it could hitherto cope with anomalies, including facts that did not
‘fit’ the overall framework. Now that these anomalies are both numerous and
visible, the dominant paradigm is called into question as a useful and appropriate
device for helping understand north Korean politics. There is a now a substantial
alternative body of literature underpinned by sets of assumptions different from
the securitization paradigm, but this ‘paradigm in waiting’ has not yet replaced
the securitization paradigm. The alternative conceptual frameworks (paradigms)
available to the dominant ‘mad’ or ‘bad’ options are what I shall call the ‘sad’ or
‘rational actor’ options; either of these, I will argue, forms a better puzzle-solving
framework than the ‘mad’ or ‘bad’ approaches. The argument demonstrates,
however, that paradigm shift away from the dominant perspective is not an
automatic or easy process. Sociological factors, including the relative visibility
of the scientific community working within this perspective, can serve to give
the securitization paradigm a life of its own long after its utility has been called
into question. This is evidenced by the continued dominance of the securi-
tization perspective in the literature, irrespective of both the numerous anomalies
and the available alternatives.
The securitization paradigm: what it is and what it does
The securitization paradigm differs from a straightforward security-based analysis
because of the former’s overweening single-factor analysis and because of its
heavy normative commitments. Although it accepts the classical security assump-
tions that military power and military instruments are ultimately the only
significant factors of analysis in respect to Korea, it goes further than this by
sublimating all other issues, including DPRK economic, cultural and humani-
tarian policies, within a military-based analysis. In addition, its inherent
normative assumption is that the domestic and foreign politics of north Korea
provide the root cause of all tensions on the Korean peninsula.
The securitization paradigm permeates the literature on north Korea to a
greater or lesser degree. It is most visible in the US think-tank community,
where analysis coming from the American Enterprise Institute, the United
States Institute for Peace and the Institute for International Economics is most
overtly shaped by the paradigm. Two articles emanating from these institutes
have shaped the policy debates in the United States and have also articulated the
‘common-sense’ view held by the US and international media.7 This ‘common-
sensical’ view shapes all analysis of north Korea to the extent that scholarship
representing a different position, however well supported by research, is sidelined
or deemed questionable simply because it does not fit well with the sociological
7 These are Nicholas Eberstadt, ‘Hastening Korean reunification’, Foreign Affairs 76: 2, 1997 and Marcus
Noland, ‘Why North Korea will muddle through’, Foreign Affairs 76: 4, 1997. Eberstadt is a researcher
with the American Enterprise Institute. Noland is Senior Fellow at the Institute for International
Economics.
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consensus of the research community.8 These assumptions are so pervasive that
they also creep into analysis which does not overtly share the world-view of the
securitization prism, with the tendency to accept, unless proved otherwise, the
securitization view of north Korea.
The securitization perspective portrays north Korean politics as mad in the
sense of being irrational and unknowable and bad in the sense of the motivation
and impetus for policy being ascribed to normatively unacceptable characteristics
of the state and its leadership. That these two aspects of the paradigm are
sometimes contradictory—if the state is mad, can it really be understood as bad
in the sense of being consciously directed by an evil intent whose instigators could
take responsibility for their actions?—is not a problem for the paradigm given
that these are assumptions made prior to analysis. As long as these assumptions
prove fruitful in solving research puzzles, at least within the Kuhnian theory of
paradigms, they will continue to shape scientific enquiry. Nor do these paradig-
matic assumptions need always to give rise to precisely the same conclusions.
Kuhn informs us that paradigms shape research questions, acting as a filtering
device to weed out assumptions which do not fit paradigmatic frameworks.
They may thus narrow the theoretical agenda, but they also permit differing
research outcomes within the confines of the paradigm’s fundamental assumptions.
Thus, within the securitization paradigm we can find different strands—what I
will call the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ variants of the bad and mad perspectives.
The ‘bad’ thesis
The ‘bad’ thesis assumes that the DPRK pursues alien objectives which are
normative anathema to the rest of the ‘civilized’ international system. The
assumption that the north Korean state and its leadership are fundamentally
outside the pale of the global community underpins the terminology sometimes
used to describe north Korea as a ‘rogue state’. From this perspective, the DPRK
is motivated by malevolence and belligerence and its leadership’s foreign and
domestic policies can be ascribed to evil intent. Internationally, north Korea is
ready to make war upon its neighbours, perhaps even to attack the United
States itself and, in pursuit of these offensive aims, is constantly engaged in a
furtive arms buildup.
This perspective underlies much of the US foreign policy community and is
exemplified in an unsourced November 1998 United States Institute for Peace
publication.9 The document’s style conveys an extreme picture. Hostility is
8 An example of the sidelining of research findings may be found in the general lack of receptivity to the
thesis, drawn from meticulously researched work, that cooperation is an option with north Korea. See
Leon V. Sigal, Disarming strangers: nuclear diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1998). Marcus Noland, for instance, calls into question the merits of a position that directly
challenges the dominant view. See Noland, ‘Introduction’, in Marcus Noland, Economic integration of the
Korean peninsula (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1998), p. 5, commenting on
K. A. Namkung, ‘US leadership in the rebuilding of the north Korean economy’, ibid.
9 Mistrust and the Korean peninsula: dangers of miscalculation, special report (Washington DC: United States
Institute for Peace, Nov. 1998), p. 2.
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‘unremitting’, diplomats ‘demand’, actions are ‘all too clear’ and north Korea is
likened to the ultimate of US bogeymen, Saddam Hussein. The paper is premised
on claims that the north Koreans were developing a clandestine nuclear site,
claims which subsequent US inspections have found to be without foundation.10
The north Korean state is also presented as immoral, as resources are ‘diverted’
to the military instead of to a population which is suffering from severe food
shortages; but the fact that the humanitarian community has found no evidence
of a direct diversion of food to the military is not acknowledged. There is no
argument, of course, that the DPRK maintains a military capacity;11 but
whether it sees this capacity as defensive and whether or not it sees its missile
exports as a source of hard currency in order to be able to purchase necessary
inputs into its economy (as most arms-producing Western states like Britain do)
is probably a matter for interpretation.12 Russian analysts working with US
colleagues have pointed out that while DPRK arms production and
development are undesirable because they increase tensions due to possible
‘disproportionate countermeasures by the United States and Japan’, nevertheless
international law permits the DPRK to develop missiles for defence purposes
and to use space for peaceful purposes.13 This is quite unlike the case of Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq which, as a defeated power in war, is subject to UN resolutions
prohibiting and controlling arms development. And finally, the impressive
conviction of the authors’ beliefs brooks no acknowledgement of the existence
of alternative interpretations of DPRK policy.
Much is also made within the ‘bad’ thesis of the militarily offensive posture of
the north Korean armed forces, with ‘60–65 percent of those forces…close to
the border, in a high state of readiness, well primed for an attack on the
South’.14 Only analytical Korean virgins or those wanting to deceive could
unshamefacedly equate the former with the latter point of the pervious sentence.
As others have pointed out, ‘Pyongyang is only 120 kilometres from [the border
with south Korea]. Thus it might be more accurate to say that 65 per cent of
North Korea’s troops are deployed in front of their capital.’15 As the same
author remarks, ‘it would be far more surprising if the DPRK deployed its
troops in the north, away from where potential conflict could occur.’16
10 Consequently on a US Department of State visit to Pyongyang, spokesperson James P. Rubin
announced on 25 June 1999 that ‘the [suspected nuclear] site . . . does not contain a plutonium reactor or
reprocessing plant, either completed or under construction’. See <http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/
index.html>, Daily Report, p. 3.
11 For discussion see Smith, ‘ “Opening up” by default’.
12 Scholar David Kang argues that DPRK ‘military and security policy is essentially defensive and realist’.
See Kang, ‘North Korea’s military and security policy’, in Kim, ed., North Korean foreign relations, p. 182.
13 Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies and the Center for
Contemporary International Problems at the Russian Diplomatic Academy, ‘DPRK Report No. 16
(January–February 1999)’, in NorthEast Asia Peace and Security Network Special Report, <http://
www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/index.html>, p. 2.
14 Patrick M. Morgan, ‘New security arrangements between the United States and north Korea’, in Suh
and Lee, eds, North Korea after Kim Il Sung, p. 171.
15 Kang, ‘North Korea’s military and security policy’, p. 172.
16 Ibid.
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North Korea is, within the ‘bad’ perspective, a ‘garrison state’ and ‘the most
militarized society on earth’, with its population ever ready, willing and able to
wage total war against its peace-loving neighbours.17 This is because it spends
30 per cent of its budget on defence and up to 30 per cent of its population of 22
million are either in the armed forces or in local militias.18 This picture, however,
leaves out what might be relevant data for any policy-maker interested in
assessing, say, the comparative military strengths of south and north Korea. If,
for instance, we refer to the International Institute of Strategic Studies’ annual
surveys of the military strength of the world’s states, we find that the DPRK
spent an estimated $2.4 billion on its armed forces in 1998, compared to a south
Korean military expenditure of $10.2 billion. IISS data for 1998/9 informs us
that the north has 300,000 more personnel in active service that the south and
the same number of reserves. This means, of course, that north Korea’s army,
with its very low level of per capita spending compared to south Korea’s armed
forces, is liable to be operationally weak in terms of hardware and software
support. Its comparative advantage lies in its 300,000 extra personnel in
uniform; but this again is somewhat qualified by the much larger south Korean
population which would be called on in time of war—44 million to 22 million
in the north. Economically, north Korea’s estimated GNP in 1997 (the most
recent date for which figures were available) was just $18 billion, compared to
$443 billion for south Korea.19 These figures hardly suggest that north Korea is
an overwhelming military threat to the south. Indeed, south Korean President
Kim Dae-Jung argues that south Korean–US combined forces are enough to
prevent any offensive action from north Korea.20
The stated threat derives not only from the relative funding of northern and
southern armed forces, but from the efficiency and sheer volume of north
Korean forces. Here the securitization paradigm both underestimates and over-
estimates north Korean military capacity. It does grasp the readiness for war of
the DPRK’s population. All the social organizations (women’s, children’s,
business units) train their members on an annual basis so as to be prepared should
war break out. The million or so adults who form the core of the ‘permanent’
army, however, remain in the armed forces for a maximum of five to eight years
before they go on to be part-time members of the militias.21 This is to ensure
17 Edward A. Olsen, ‘The conventional military strength of north Korea: implications for inter-Korean
security’, in Suh and Lee, eds, North Korea after Kim Il Sung, p. 147.
18 Ibid. More sober analysis can be found in the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) annual
publication, The military balance. The IISS reports that for 1998/9, the north Korean army stood at just
over 1 million. Its reserves were just under 5 million. This compares to south Korea’s population of 46.5
million and armed forces at just under 700,000, with reserves at 4.5 million. See IISS, The military balance
1998/99 (Oxford: Oxford University Press/IISS, 1998), pp. 185–7.
19 IISS, The military balance 1998/99, pp. 185–7.
20 Dong-won Lim, ‘North Korean policy under the Kim Dae-Jung government’, speech at breakfast
meeting with National Reconciliation Council, March 11 1999, p. 3, quoted in Chung-in Moon,
‘Understanding the DJ doctrine: the sunshine policy and the Korean peninsula’, paper kindly sent by
author through e-mail, Sept. 1999, pp. 5–6.
21 For numbers of those in each armed service and their terms of service see IISS, The military balance 1998/
99, pp. 185–7.
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that most adults receive some training in the event of war. The north Korean
military structure therefore functions as a giant ‘Home Guard’ where the entire
population (not just 30 per cent of it) could be mobilized if necessary. Neither
the militias nor the armed forces are separate from the ‘economic’ structure, in
that much of their time is spent in construction of ‘civilian’ infrastructure and
fulfilling national requirements such as harvesting food. The 30 per cent of
GDP cited for military expenditure must therefore include this more straight-
forwardly ‘economic’ activity. That the military also takes part in non-military
activity is recognized in some of the securitization literature, although there is
little evidence of such information feeding back into the discussion of the global
sums attributed to military expenditure.22
Domestically, the DPRK is perceived as a human rights violator of such
magnitude that an unsubstantiated document from the US government published
in 1999 could state without fear of contradiction that the DPRK ‘state leader-
ship perceives most international norms of human rights, especially individual
rights, as illegitimate, alien social concepts subversive to the goals of the State
and party’.23 Unrest is such that ‘an unsubstantiated Reuters report stated that
following a March [1998] coup attempt against Kim Jong Il, authorities arrested
several thousand members of the military’.24 Individuals are routinely ‘disappeared’,
tortured, subject to arbitrary arrest, detention or forced resettlement. No fair trials
are permitted and there are no rights to privacy, with individuals constantly
subject to surveillance at home and in the community. Needless to say, there is
no freedom of speech, assembly, association, worship or movement.25
We do not know how much of the above can be substantiated, although,
again, the activity of the humanitarian community is helping to deliver some solid
information on some of these issues. For instance, we know that household
surveillance exists for preventative health purposes and could possibly be also
used for political surveillance. We know also that there is some freedom of
worship for Christians but we do not know how much.26 What we are beginning
to find out suggests a more complex picture than that portrayed by the ‘bad’
thesis. Data made available from humanitarian community reports are also able
to direct us towards more specific questions. Why is it, for instance, that we have
seen a rise in numbers of children in the orphanages since the food crisis emerged?27
Is it that there are simply more orphans due to increased mortality? Is it a sign
22 Marcus Noland, for instance, speaks of a ‘parallel’ military economy and states that ‘half of the army is
engaged in what elsewhere would be civilian economic activities.’ See Marcus Noland, ‘Prospects for the
north Korean economy’, in Suh and Lee, eds, North Korea after Kim Il Sung.
23 ‘U.S. Department of State: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Country Report on Human Rights
Practices for 1998’, mimeo from Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 26 Feb. 1999,
published on <http://www.reliefweb.int>, p. 1.
24 Ibid., p. 2.
25 The report does not cite sources, although these are available to the US government. See for instance the
thoughtful discussion based on interviews with north Korean defectors in Roy Richard Grinker, Korea
and its futures: unification and the unfinished war (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998). The problem with such
unsourced reporting is that it is impossible to assess what is fact and what is interpretation.
26 Author’s interview, CARITAS Hong Kong representative, Pyongyang, April/May 1998.
27 Author’s interviews with UNICEF and WFP representatives, Pyongyang, May 1998.
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that familial and community support structures are breaking down? Or is there
more dissidence and are these children somehow being separated from their parents
for more sinister reasons? We simply do not know the answers to these questions.
Conversely, one might not normally expect citizens suffering such extreme
deprivation (the domestic aspects) to be able and willing to fight a total war
involving every member of the population (the foreign policy aspect); but this
contradiction can be absorbed by the paradigm. Citizens are so effectively
brainwashed by the propaganda of the regime that they have lost their capacity
for independent thought. Rather than a potential war providing the oppor-
tunity for liberation from an authoritarian leader (as, say, seems to be happening
in Serbia since the Kosovo war), the north Korean people, according to this
perspective, would be expected to operate as an undifferentiated mass in support
of the north Korean leadership.
The hard version of this thesis argues that the north Korean state is unredeem-
able. Writing on nuclear issues in the context of reunification, for instance, but
from within a framework which is meant to apply as a generalization about the
nature of the DPRK, Nicholas Eberstadt writes that ‘The North Korean regime
is the North Korean nuclear problem, and unless its intentions change, which is
unlikely, that problem will continue as long as the regime is in place.’28
‘Western governments’ should ‘unflinchingly’ assess whether they can change
the north Korean state.29 The inference is clear. Only eradication of the regime
will do. The methods are not made explicit, but given north Korea’s unwilling-
ness to be bulldozed into a quick unification, the hastening of reunification as
advocated by Eberstadt implies coercion which, in the circumstances of the
Korean peninsula, would very likely mean war. If such a policy were to be
implemented the result would be that south Koreans and US citizens (though
not US policy analysts, of course) would have to ‘unflinchingly’ step forward to
be called to fight and die (again) in Korea.30
The soft version of this thesis accepts the assumptions of the bad perspective.
North Korea ‘extorts’ aid from the United States; it engages in ‘blackmail efforts’
and in ‘provocative behaviour’.31 The DPRK ‘undoubtedly’ would like to ‘rule
the entire Korean Peninsula’ even though ‘it knows that … goal unachievable and
foolish to pursue’.32 The soft approach, however, does not view the DPRK as
possessing overwhelming military capabilities or as totally intractable. The
DPRK does not possess ‘a plausible invasion capability against South Korea’.33
28 Nicholas Eberstadt, ‘Hastening Korean reunification’, Foreign Affairs 76: 2, 1997, p. 88, emphasis in
original.
29 Ibid., pp. 88, 89.
30 The message of this approach uncannily mirrors that of an earlier US citizen with an interest in Korea. A
US reporter wrote in May 1950, just prior to the outbreak of the Korean war, that John Foster Dulles
was ‘militantly for the unification of Korea. Openly says it must be brought about soon.’ Quoted in Jon
Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: the unknown war (London: Pantheon, 1988), p. 65.
31 Pedro Almeida and Michael O’Hanlon, ‘Impasse in Korea: a conventional arms-accord solution?’,
Survival 41: 1, Spring 1999.
32 Ibid., p. 69.
33 Ibid., p. 60.
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Although this approach does not rule out the possibilities of negotiating with
north Korea, as it still conceives of the DPRK as an inherently untrustworthy
partner, it remains difficult to see how a deal based on such premises could
provide the basis for the confidence-building and trust necessary for an
agreement to be achieved and implemented.
The ‘mad’ thesis
The mad thesis is essentially a subfield of the bad thesis, relying as it does on a
notion of evil intent as one of its fundamental assumptions. The difference
between the ‘bad’ and the ‘mad’ theses is that the former presumes a rational,
instrumental actor, the latter an irrational actor, unknowable, unpredictable and
dangerous because of the underlying presumed ill intent of its leadership.
Another difference is that, while the ‘mad’ thesis implies something primeval
and atavistic, with policy arising from a sort of primitive, chaotic and fundamentally
unknowable polity and society, the ‘bad’ thesis assumes strategic intentionality
on the part of DPRK authorities.
North Korean politics is viewed as ‘mad’ in the sense of a tendency to an
often inexplicable non-compliance with international norms and because it is
irrational in its apparent refusal to follow optimal preference-maximizing
behaviour.34 North Korea is therefore unpredictable in its domestic and foreign
policy behaviour. For these reasons negotiating with north Korea is always
fraught with danger as DPRK negotiators cannot be trusted to behave in the
way that conventional diplomacy requires; nor can they be trusted to honour
outcomes of agreements reached.
The extreme or ‘hard’ version of the madness thesis argues that terrible,
inexplicable things which would be outside the pale of normal human existence
go on inside north Korea—such as cannibalism, usually involving boiling up
babies for the stewpot.35 The Economist provided a classic example of the former
approach in its July 1999 survey on Korea, with its front cover given entirely over
to a suitably demonic-looking portrait of Kim Jong Il.36 The accompanying
commentary inside rounds off its analysis of north Korea in its conventionally
unsubstantiated style: ‘And there is madness. A family talking to a journalist for
the first time since escaping to the mountains in China say they left because they
had run out of hope. The mother, in her 50s, had visited a neighbour, who had
been due to give birth. There was no sign of the baby. The woman had
something boiling in a pot on the stove. She said it was a rabbit. It wasn’t.’37
34 One commentator notes that if north Korea had behaved as ‘a rational regime’ in its negotiations with
Japan it could have achieved desirable outcomes in terms of economic support. See Aidan Foster-Carter,
North Korea: peace, war or implosion? (Seoul: Jardine Fleming Securities Ltd, June 1997), p. 20. Another
warns that north Korea should ‘choose [its] policies rationally’: See Kyongmann Jeon, ‘The likelihood
and implications of a north Korean attack on the south’, in Noland, ed., Economic integration of the Korean
peninsula, p. 20.
35 There has not been a substantiated account of cannibalism in north Korea. This is not to say that such
concerns should not be taken seriously, but it does mean that those who make these allegations have
themselves a responsibility to undertake serious and systematic investigation of any such claims.
36 The Economist, 10–16 July 1999.
37 ‘The Koreas Survey’, ibid., p. 14.
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The ‘soft’ version of the mad thesis simply asserts that north Korea is
unknowable and therefore uninterpretable because, it is alleged, there is no
reliable information about the country. Marcus Noland, for instance, in what
has become a benchmark article on the DPRK, states baldly that ‘there is an
acute lack of information [about north Korea]’ and, in the same article, that
‘virtually all economic and social data are regarded as state secrets’.38 Robert
Scalapino points to the DPRK as a ‘mystery’ while at the same time arguing that
it ‘would be a serious mistake to assume that…we know nothing about the
DPRK’.39 The eighteen-page report on ‘North and South Korea’ in the Under-
standing Global Issues series states that in any discussion of north Korea ‘lack of
hard information is a constant problem’ (before going on to present a perfectly
adequate account of north Korean politics and the economy, along with source
references in the document itself!).40 This is not to say, of course, that the
DPRK is an open polity with a Freedom of Information Act just around the
corner. It is to say, however, that such a perspective denies in principle the
knowability of north Korea and, more recently, has not acknowledged the
successes of the aid community in achieving inroads into DPRK impenetra-
bility.
Perhaps the least subtle accounts in this genre are those which argue that the
DPRK is such an expert in deception that critical evaluation of DPRK politics
is almost impossible. This assumption is largely based on the contention that
even when the DPRK went so far as to plan a war against south Korea in 1950,
absolutely no evidence could be found of a premeditated invasion of the south
in captured Central Committee files when the US-led UN forces captured
Pyongyang.41 This shows the ‘regime’s devotion to strategic secrecy’, even to the
extent of hiding its intentions from its own senior officials.42 Even, therefore, ‘the
formal evidentiary record of officially revealed DPRK pronouncements and
actions…must be treated as problematic’. This is a state that is ‘preternaturally
secretive’. The DPRK, so the argument goes, has retained a commitment to
38 Noland, ‘Why north Korea will muddle through’, quotes on pp. 105 and 107 respectively. Charitably,
one could argue that Noland exaggerates to make the point. That this is so is borne out by his own
research, where he uses available data in a rigorous manner to draw certain conclusions about the north
Korean economy. See Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson and Tao Wang, Famine in north Korea: causes
and cures, Working Paper no. 99–2 (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1999). What
he probably wants to argue is that the data available are sometimes unsatisfactory and he would like more
of them, something that could be argued about many countries of the world. This more nuanced
message would not, however, help to build a picture of a singularly unknowable DPRK.
39 Robert A. Scalapino, ‘Introduction’, in Suh and Lee, eds, North Korea after Kim Il Sung, p. 1.
40 Richard Buckley, ed., North and south Korea: the last ideological frontier (Cheltenham: Understanding Global
Issues, 1998).
41 Quotes in this paragraph are from Nicholas Eberstadt, ‘North Korea’s unification policy: 1948–1996’, in
Kim, ed., North Korean foreign relations in the post-Cold War era, pp. 236–9. That the lack of such evidence
might warrant a different interpretation from the standard account is not acknowledged. For an
authoritative account of the outbreak of the Korean war, see Bruce Cumings, Korea’s place in the sun: A
modern history (New York: Norton, 1997), pp. 260–4. The north Koreans have yet another view. See the
self-explanatory title of Ho Jong Ho, Kang Sok Hui and Pak Thae Ho, The US imperialists started the
Korean war (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1993).
42 Eberstadt, ‘North Korea’s unification policy’, p. 237. The irony that the lack of reliable evidence does
not seen to stop this author from drawing some very strong conclusions indeed about DPRK policy
seems lost.
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strategic deception throughout its existence as a state, right up until the present
day. Then there is the ‘damned if you do and damned if you don’t’ mode of
analysis. This is the approach that views north Korean compliance with an
agreement as a sure sign of intended non-compliance. In an article published in
1998, for instance, Patrick Morgan notes that ‘although it has carefully fulfilled
its obligations initially, North Korea will at some point make trouble over the
implementation of the Agreed Framework’.43
Securitizing north Korea
Cold War assumptions, for all that they are contradictory and often unsubstan-
tiated, remain embedded in the post-Cold War literature about north Korea.
That many of the very strong claims of the securitization paradigm remain
unsupported by evidence does not imply a weakness for this perspective. If a
government is so much beyond the norms of international society, it stands to
reason that such a government would do everything in its power to prevent an
independent assessment of the facts. Lack of corroboration, in a manner Orwell
would have appreciated, becomes corroboration of those things needing to be
corroborated.
North Korea and the international community: past and present
The large influx of foreign visitors from 1995 onwards forced an opening up to
alternative sources of information and opinion other than those propagated by
the government and party organizations. There are three main groups of
foreigners with access to north Korea that act as important sources of new ideas
and practices for north Koreans.44 The first group is the south Koreans
organizing trade, cultural, political, industrial and social cooperation, as well as
(but to a much lesser extent) the large numbers of south Korean tourists. The
second is the resident and visiting international humanitarian community. The
third group comprises the foreign economic operators attracted by the free
trade zones in the north and the possibilities of gaining a foothold in what could
be a dynamic market area should Korean integration (not necessarily full
unification) be achieved. This influx of foreigners demonstrates an extraordinary
change in north Korean governmental policy—which, partly because of
necessity and partly out of design, has now permitted access to the country in a
way which would have been inconceivable just five years ago. This does not
mean that all foreigners are permitted to enter the DPRK. The Western media,
with the major exception of CNN, is still more or less prohibited from
43 Morgan, ‘New security arrangements’, p. 171.
44 There have been other groups of resident and visiting foreigners in the DPRK since 1994. For instance,
the US military has small groups of its soldiers living in Pyongyang in 1998 to help in the search for the
so-called ‘missing in action’ (MIA) of the Korean war. I highlight in this section, however, those groups
of foreign visitors that are likely to have a pervasive impact on north Korean society and culture.
76_3_11_Smith 13/6/00, 4:50 pm604
Bad, mad, sad or rational actor?

reporting from north Korea and as a result is not in a position to report changes
within north Korean society.45
The relatively large numbers of foreigners who have either become resident
in the DPRK or who have visited regularly are imbricated in the DPRK’s
domestic and international politics in a quite different way from previous visitors.
Today’s foreigners legally accumulate data and material about north Korea, in
cooperation with the north Korean government, and this material is openly
conveyed back to Western governments—including old arch-enemies like the
United States. One result of this new relationship has been to increase openness
and trust between the DPRK government and representatives of the West, so as
to lay the basis for potential engagement on the more sensitive areas of conflict
such as the DPRK’s missile development programme. This does not mean to
say that the involvement of the international community in north Korea will
necessarily lead to a resolution of the security impasse between the DPRK and
the United States. It does indicate, however, that north Korea has, in very
practical terms, moved to a policy of large-scale involvement with the
international community already—even before any formal peace agreement has
been signed. Among other things, this shows the north Korean government’s
ability to adapt to changing circumstances through what for the DPRK was a
radical policy shift that occurred in a very short period of time.
Past: The ‘hermit kingdom’
North Korea has been characteristically described as a ‘hermit kingdom’. Its
successful political socialization of its people has been attributed to its ability to
shield its population from sources of information other than governmental and
party-controlled output, through prevention of contact with foreigners either
personally or through access to foreign media. Its Juche philosophy had stressed
self-reliance and an abhorrence of what it called ‘flunkeyism’, which meant any
form of subordination to foreign influence.46 Nor had foreign trade provided a
catalyst for foreign contact. This was mainly because the volume of eternal trade
remained very low—at its height reaching a total of $5.2 billion in 1988, but
falling to $2.1 billion in 1995 and $1.98 billion in 1996.47 Prior to the end of the
Cold War, by far the majority of trade was with other communist states,
particularly the former Soviet Union. Borders through which trade passed were
situated on remote parts of the Soviet Union and China, with little physical
opportunity for the import of foreign ideas along with the oil and industrial
imports which came from abroad. In addition, trade was organized by
45 Ted Turner, the owner of CNN, developed a modus operandi with the late President Kim Il Sung before
the latter’s death in 1974, which has enabled CNN to continue to report from Pyongyang.
46 For background on north Korean history and culture see Smith et al., eds, North Korea in the new world
order.
47 The first two figures are from Lee, ‘The road to the market’, p. 23. The last figure is from Soogil Young,
Chang-Jae Lee and Hyoungsoo Zang, ‘Preparing for the economic integration of two Koreas: policy
challenges to south Korea’, in Noland, ed., Economic integration of the Korean peninsula, p. 253.
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centralized governmental agencies with little direct contact between industrial
and agricultural operators and foreign trade partners.
Although the DPRK had attempted to insulate itself from foreign influence,
it had had a degree of contact with the international community. During the
Cold War foreign residents included the diplomatic community, representatives
of international organizations like FAO and UNDP, technical experts (usually
from eastern Europe), foreign business representatives and researchers.48 Apart
from the resident community, the DPRK was often host to foreign visitors
(scholars, art troupes, sports teams, Koreans living in Japan, tourists from eastern
Europe, etc.) for periods of between a few days and several months. DPRK
officials therefore have had more experience in dealing with foreigners than an
image which views the DPRK as an isolated ‘hermit kingdom’ might suggest.
In addition, DPRK officials had overseas experience, in Asia (particularly
India), Africa, and the major international organizations.
Present: the international community in the DPRK—who it is, why it’s there and what
it found
It was the spectacular degeneration of the economy, among the symptoms and
causes of which was the loss of historically dominant trading partners, which
precipitated the humanitarian crisis that forced the engagement of the
international community with north Korea from 1995 onwards.49 It also forced
a reconsideration of trade patterns, so that current trade options envisage
partnership with the non-communist international community in such a way as
also to make inevitable the permeation of north Korean society with alternative
sources of information and opinion to those of the government.
The south Korean presence After the 1994 nuclear crisis, opening up came in the
sense that the DPRK began to play host to south Korean nationals in a way
which had never before been possible. Limited numbers of south Koreans had
previously visited the DPRK, but after 1994 the influx swelled from a trickle to
a deluge. South Korean visitors included cultural troupes, business represen-
tatives and politicians as well as engineers helping to build the new nuclear
power station promised under the 1994 Agreed Framework. Chung-In Moon,
48 By 1975 the DPRK was a member of 141 international organizations. As of 1989, the DPRK had
diplomatic relations with over 100 states. For the former figure see Hazel Smith, ‘North Korean foreign
policy in the 1990s: the realist approach’, in Smith et al., eds, North Korea in the new world order, p. 100;
for the latter figure see ‘100 questions and answers: do you know about Korea?’ (Pyongyang: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1989), p. 114.
49 This article is not the place to discuss the scale or the scope of the economic crisis of the 1990s, except to
note its effects of the opening up of north Korea. However, there are several useful accounts. Jung
Chang Yuoung notes, for instance, that the end of the Soviet Union as a reliable trading partner for
north Korea ‘had a devastating effect on the north Korean economy’. For detail see Jung Chang
Yuoung, ‘North Korea’s trade policy’, in Hong Yung Lee and Chung Chongwook, eds, Korean options
in a changing international order (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); quote is on p. 157. See
also Lee, ‘The road to the market’; Young, Lee and Zang, ‘Preparing for the economic integration of
two Koreas: policy challenges to south Korea’.
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a prominent south Korean analyst of north–south relations, has referred to what
he has termed the ‘phenomenal growth in the number of visitors to the North
[from south Korea]’.50 Between 1988 and 1997 just 2,408 south Koreans visited
north Korea; by comparison, in the sixteen months between February 1998 and
June 1999, 5,600 visited the DPRK.51 None of these visits were ‘casual’ or
spontaneous trips. Instead, each of these individuals would be part of the effort
to implement some project which would enhance and consolidate normalization
and cooperation between north and south Korea. Probably the most spectacular
example of north Korean ‘opening up’ to its former deadly adversaries was the
admission, between November 1998 and August 1999, of 80,000 south Korean
tourists to visit Mount Kumgan (Diamond Mountain) in the south-east of north
Korea—in an operation jointly organized with the south Korean conglomerate
Hyundai.52
The humanitarian community For all the great increase in their numbers, south
Korean tourists were discouraged from mixing with north Koreans, and it was
not tourism but humanitarianism which added a different dimension to the
international politics of the DPRK between 1995 and 1999, as over 100
humanitarian staff took up residence in Pyongyang and the DPRK played host
to hundreds more visitors from representatives of large and small humanitarian
agencies.53 Part of their mission was to elicit and to disseminate information
about north Korean society in order that they could continue to justify to donor
governments the necessity for humanitarian intervention and so that they could
monitor the effectiveness of emergency and development programmes.
It is impossible to overstate the significance of the change in policy indicated
by the DPRK government’s call to the international agencies for help in late
1995. Although there is no evidence that the DPRK perceived those organiza-
tions as simple instruments of US imperialism—indeed, the regime had worked
with UNDP, FAO and UNICEF since the 1980s—there must have been a
recognition that agency involvement would mean greater access to the DPRK
by ‘non-friendly’ governments, if only because DPRK diplomats were well aware
that the major UN agencies are primarily funded by the major Western powers.
The DPRK also initiated contact with US non-governmental organizations in
late 1995 when New York-based DPRK diplomats started directly calling
NGOs like Mercy Corps to ask for help to combat the food shortages.54 The
lead operational organizations were the UN’s World Food Programme (WFP)
and UNICEF. WFP has by far the largest humanitarian presence in the DPRK,
with forty-six resident staff as at late 1998, most of whom are ‘aid monitors’ and
50 Moon, ‘Understanding the DJ doctrine’, p. 13, emphasis added.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid. See also text of the ROK Ministry of Unification’s report on Important tasks in north–south
reconciliation and cooperation, NorthEast Asia Peace and Security Network Special report <http://
www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/index.html>, p. 2.
53 See Smith, ‘ “Opening up” by default’.
54 Author’s interview, Mercy Corps, Washington DC, Nov. 1998.
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whose job it is to track aid supplies from the ports to the recipients. NGOs
including Oxfam, Concern Worldwide, German Agro Action, Médecins Du
Monde (MDM) and Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) also set up programmes in
the DPRK. This was the first time that the DPRK had ever worked with
NGOs.
Relations with the international humanitarian community were originally
very fraught, and evolved gradually through a process of mutual learning to a
still contradictory but on the whole useful working relationship by 1999. I have
detailed the evolution of this relationship elsewhere, and for the purposes of this
article need only to summarize the change in the relationship between the inter-
national community and the government. This change came about through the
process of negotiations which were often tough but resulted in visible gains
including increased access to territory, individuals and data.55 By 1999 the
humanitarian community had access to about 75 per cent of the country and 80
per cent of the population.56 As well as large amounts of information on facilities
and institutions, the humanitarian community also gained access to good quality
quantitative data about the scale of the crisis through the agreement with the
government to permit scientific surveys which included both random sampling
and UNICEF’s multiple indicator cluster survey (MICS).57 Information gained
through the activities of these organizations was disseminated in reports to
donors, and through press and publicity work. The cumulative impact of
humanitarian community activity meant that, within the space of just four
years, data which had never been available outside the DPRK in the history of
the state became accessible to the wider international community. If the ‘bad’
perspective had been right about the Cold War, when all social data had been
considered secrets of state, it was just plain incorrect to state that the DPRK
maintained this view into the late 1990s.
It was not that the process of achieving a mutually acceptable modus operandi
was trouble-free. The humanitarian organizations’ early concern about the lack
of reliable data had been so grave that in late 1997 the governmental and non-
governmental organizations had met in Geneva to discuss, among other things,
whether to pull out of the DPRK. MSF continued to believe that they could not
organize in such a way so as to meet the needs of aid recipients to best effect, and
this factor, combined with their inability to secure sufficient financial backing for
their work in the DPRK, caused them to cease operations in 1998.58 Other
agencies, including a variety of NGOs, disagreed with MSF and remained in the
DPRK, arguing that there was much evidence of ‘a learning process of many
[north Korean] people in dealing with foreigners…The authorities and the
55 Smith, ‘ “Opening up” by default’.
56 Omawale Omawale, ‘An exercise in ambivalence: negotiating with north Korea’, Harvard Asia Pacific
Review 3: 2, 1999.
57 Ibid.; Smith, ‘ “Opening up” by default’.
58 Smith, ‘ “Opening up” by default’, p. 11; United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal for the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (New York: United Nations, Jan. 1998), p. 3.
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people have opened up as far as normal life is concerned.’59 In 1999, a
Californian NGO confirmed the trend towards openness and mutual trust:
Although small in scale and technologically simple, our village wind power project was
nonetheless politically and logistically challenging. Yet it was carried out successfully in
less than a year by American and North Korean teams working side by side with a
generally courteous, upbeat, and cooperative spirit. Perhaps the most important lesson
we learned was simply that it is possible to ‘do business’ with North Koreans. Our
counterparts signed an agreement and honored their written commitments, which
included erecting buildings, providing competent personnel, allowing necessary access,
and making adequate logistical arrangements.60
The major UN agencies also charted a learning curve both for themselves
and for the government. Negotiations over the modalities of scientific surveys
took place throughout 1998, and in the end went some way to achieving what
both partners wanted: access to good quality information in a way which was
not seen to infringe north Korean autonomy. Dr Omawale Omawale, the
UNICEF Special Representative to the DPRK throughout 1998, argued that
the international community had achieved much more in its relationship than it
perhaps realized: ‘Much of the rhetoric surrounding relations with North Korea
focuses on frustrations faced in bringing the country into “normal” relations
with the rest of the world and in having the country’s practices coincide with
established international norms. While these are justifiable goals, their
achievement will only come with mature reflection and action based on an
optimistic view that the glass is already half full.’61
The securitization paradigm provided the lens through which international
organizations’ representatives received their initial information about the
DPRK.62 The image available to the humanitarian community was consequently
of a country about which there was little or no reliable information, with a
government that was either bad or mad or both; a country whose negotiators
were unlikely to be trustworthy, truthful or reliable in the keeping and imple-
menting of agreements. Consequently, humanitarian community policy-makers
found that their experience could not be understood through the securitization
lens. First of all, they found a society visibly in a process of change. Second, they
found a more complex society and polity than that predicted by the dominant
paradigm. Third, they experienced cooperation as well as (sometimes) intransi-
gence. Fourth, their negotiating experience taught them that on the whole
DPRK policy-makers, like policy-makers everywhere, were rational actors in
59 Confidential German NGO report, Feb. 1999.
60 Jim Williams et al., ‘The wind farm in the cabbage patch’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55: 3, May/June
1999, p. 46.
61 Omawale, ‘An exercise in ambivalence’, p. 62.
62 This author participated in the briefing of some of the international aid organizations that placed resident
workers in the DPRK—particularly Children’s Aid Direct and UNICEF—and has since worked with
NGOs and the UN humanitarian community resident in the DPRK. Briefing prior to posting about the
DPRK is often surprisingly perfunctory.
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terms of seeking to satisfy interest and achieve objectives. These are not the
disembodied rational actors of game-theoretic models, but historically and
socially situated subjects.63 For example, this was a society profoundly affected
by a fairly recent experience of war and a recurrent threat of war, most recently
in 1994, which did not have a peace treaty with its major adversary, the United
States, and which was therefore initially reluctant to allow open access to
information which could be perceived as useful to the ‘enemy’.64 Finally, the
humanitarian community found DPRK policy-makers just as interested in
meeting welfare needs as themselves—even if also just as aware of a potential
security dimension to humanitarian activity.
Economic operators South Koreans are visiting north Korea to find ways of
stimulating trade, and, partly as a result of such contacts, north–south trade has
shown a significant increase in the first six months of 1999 compared to those
same months in 1998.65 Another sign of increased contact between the DPRK
and the outside world is the increased activity in the Rajin–Sonbong free trade
zone in the north-east of the country. In 1997, 111,500 foreign business
representatives and leaders visited this region (compared to 43,000 in 1996).
The vast majority came from China (111,080), but 100 were from the United
States (compared to 15 in 1996) and 80 from Japan (compared to 20 in 1996).66
DPRK overall trade levels are still plummeting, however, down nearly 40 per
cent in the first half of 1999 from the same period in 1998.67 This means, among
other things, that a requirement for continuing activity by the resident
humanitarian community is likely.
The foreign media Western journalists by and large did not, and still do not, have
easy access to the country. There are some exceptions. The excellent six-part
Thames television series, Korea: the unknown war, was organized with the input
of the north Korean media.68 CNN, the BBC, CBC and the Washington Times
have in the post-Cold War period all had access to at least parts of the country
and to interviews. Press output has, however, tended to reflect the cruder
conceptions of the securitization paradigm, with the DPRK portrayed as mad,
bad, predictable and unpredictable, all at the same time. Sometimes working on
the premises that the normal rules of journalistic convention (checking sources,
for instance) do not apply because the paradigm persuades them that there is no
63 For such a perspective on north Korean nuclear issues see Bruce Cumings, ‘Nuclear imbalance of terror:
the American surveillance regime and north Korea’s nuclear programme’, in Raju G. C. Thomas, ed.,
The nuclear non-proliferation regime: prospects for the 21st century (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), ch. 10.
64 Omawale, ‘An exercise in ambivalence’.
65 Moon, ‘Understanding the DJ doctrine’, pp. 14–15.
66 For detail on the Rajin–Sonbong free trade area see the UNDP information available on
<www.tradp.org>. For figures quoted here see Tumen secretariat, UNDP, <http://www.tradp.org/
htmls/tourdprk.htm>, 1998.
67 <NAPSNet@nautilus.org>, 26 July 1999.
68 See the book of the series by Halliday and Cumings, Korea: the unknown war, which contains stunning
pictorial images of the conflict.
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reliable information about the DPRK, the ‘quality’ press have a poor record in
analysing north Korea.69 Bruce Cumings, for instance, in a detailed, historically
informed and scholarly rebuttal of the common conceptions of north Korean
behaviour during the 1994 nuclear crisis, has described the approach of US
newspapers ‘of record’ as underlain by an ‘ahistoricity [that] went hand-in-hand
with assertions that failed a freshman logic class’.70
Securitization as a guide to international policy-makers in the DPRK
The securitization paradigm no doubt captures elements of north Korean
politics. DPRK policy-makers can be unpredictable (as the ‘mad’ thesis implies)
but they can also, often, be very predictable indeed (as the ‘bad’ thesis asserts).
The state does engage in practices that would not be acceptable in liberal polities
anywhere, most starkly in its suppression of dissidence.71 Yet this perspective
does not tell the whole story about north Korea; and, worse, it distorts the
complexities of north Korean politics and policies. This means that the
perspective lacks utility for contemporary international foreign policy-makers
(including the military, diplomats and the humanitarian organizations).
There are five major problems. The first is that the many of the paradigm’s
strongest claims are not supported by evidence. The second is that the perspec-
tive cannot assimilate change. The third is that the claims of the paradigm are so
stark that they brook little qualification. The fourth is that the framework
attempts to ignore data that do not fit within the framework yet which could be
relevant for policy-makers. The fifth is that when data which do not fit the
paradigm cannot be ignored, they are distorted to meet the requirements of the
perspective—in other words, they are securitized.
The first problem is perhaps the easiest to deal with. Given increased access
to the DPRK, one could expect to see more research backed up by the
conventional rules of scholarly enquiry in the future. This is already happening
with some of the work that is being carried out on economic options for north
Korea’s future.72 Of course, the provision of more data (according to Kuhn)
does not necessarily lead to a change in paradigm if the scientist working within
the old paradigm still maintains its fundamental assumptions. For instance, the
opening paragraphs of a serious economic analysis of north Korean futures
69 See The Economist, 10–16 July 1999 for a review that tells us more about the predilections of the
magazine than it does about north Korea. For a truly risible piece which purports to offer ‘firm evidence
of a society that after years of starvation has descended into medieval barbarism’, see James Pringle, The
Times, 4 Feb. 1999. How was this evidence gathered?—‘through my binoculars’.
70 Cumings, ‘Nuclear imbalance of terror’, p. 212. Bruce Cumings has studied and researched north and
south Korea for over twenty years and is one of the world’s leading authorities.
71 Hwang Jang-Yop, the architect of the DPRK’s ruling Juche ideology who defected to Seoul in February
1997, argued in 1991 that the DPRK would not liberalize in the sense of allowing other ideologies (as
for instance Gorbachev had in the late 1980s). Author’s interview, Pyongyang, August 1991. For further
discussion see Hazel Smith, ‘Defecting to snatch victory from defeat’, The World Today 53: 3, March
1997.
72 See Noland et al., Famine in north Korea.




nevertheless manage to use an anecdote about DPRK soldiers pulling bananas
out of their rucksacks to impress upon readers the sinister nature of DPRK
society.73 The same article comes to the conclusion that if ‘famine materializes,
its roots will be in political decisions made in Pyongyang, not material resource
constraints’.74 This conclusion is interesting, since the vast body of economic
analysis from international organizations operating within the country—analysis
which has been generally supported by donor states including the United States,
the European Union, south Korea and others—is that any famine is the product
of both causes and that material resource constraints are a very major factor
indeed.75
The last four problems are pertinent to two aspects of the intrinsic nature of
paradigms and, if Kuhn is taken as a guide, more difficult to resolve. The first
aspect is that, for Kuhn, the fundamental assumptions of a paradigm are
constitutive of a paradigm. In other words, if these are called into question and
found wanting, that paradigm fails. It can no longer operate as a guide for analysis.
Thus it is much more problematic to challenge fundamental assumptions of a
paradigm. These must be left in place if the paradigm is to continue to have any
meaning at all. Second, Kuhn tells us that scientists working within fundamental
assumptions of a paradigm discount as unmeaningful data that are not commen-
surate with its overall world-view. Paradigms can be perpetuated, therefore,
even when data are available which, if analysed, might serve to force change or,
at least, reconsideration of the paradigm.
One fundamental assumption of the securitization paradigm is that the
DPRK has an unchanging persona in world and domestic affairs that cannot be
altered unless the regime is eradicated.76 Diplomacy or negotiation with DPRK
policy-makers is fruitless as interests of the international community and the
DPRK can never coincide and, furthermore, the DPRK’s inherent belligerence
means that it will always be an intransigent partner in negotiations. By definition,
then, if the paradigm cannot assimilate change as a variable so it cannot help to
inform negotiators when and why DPRK foreign policy behaviour is
changing.77 As I have argued elsewhere, the only choices available for policy-
73 Noland, ‘Why north Korea will muddle through’, pp. 105–6.
74 Ibid., p. 110.
75 A useful document is that prepared by UNDP and the DPRK government for the ‘thematic roundtable
meeting on agricultural recovery and environmental protection’, known as the AREP plan (unpublished
mimeo, May 1998). A report of the meeting is in the ‘back-to-office report’ of the World Food
Programme (unpublished mimeo, May 1998). Many of the donors attributed responsibility to DPRK
policies for the food crisis but all, even the harshest, acknowledged that lack of material resources was a
problem and, furthermore, that since the crisis emerged in 1995, there has been evidence of change in
DPRK policies. See UK presidency report, European Union technical mission to the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, 9–16 May 1998. A more widely available source which makes some mention of the
causation of the food crisis is United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
76 Eberstadt, ‘North Korea’s unification policy’.
77 In an article published prior to the emergence of the food crisis, I argue that here had been clearly
discernible changes in DPRK foreign policy orientation and practices. See Smith, ‘North Korean foreign
policy in the 1990s’.
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makers using this perspective are paralysis (nothing can be done with the
DPRK) or confrontation (nothing should be done with the DPRK).78
A second fundamental assumption of the securitization paradigm is that the
DPRK is such a singularly bad or mad entity that only the starkest descriptors
are appropriate. Thus, for policy-makers, should some of those stark descriptions
be called into question, questions are raised about the verisimilitude of any other
fundamental assumptions of the paradigm. Third, the securitization perspective
(by its nature as a paradigm) filters out facts and conceptions that do not fit its
fundamental assumptions so that evidence of contrary behaviour is not analysed.
Given the stark nature of the DPRK portrayed by the paradigm, this means that
much of the more nuanced information gathered by the humanitarian
community since 1995 would simply be judged ‘out of court’—inadmissible as
evidence. And fourth, if data are assimilated through the lens of the paradigm
they are sublimated to the fundamental assumptions so that their meaning and
import are interpreted as confirmation of those assumptions. A good example is
Noland’s view of the soldiers pulling out two bananas from their rucksacks.
They could have been stealing an unauthorized snack break; but the
interpretation is of ‘a surreptitious trade in bananas’.79 In this way data are
‘securitized’ to fit the message of a normatively unacceptable and bizarre system
and society that is the DPRK.
Combined, these problems can contribute to dangerous decision-making.
Any decision-maker operating wholly within the thrall of either the ‘mad’ or
the ‘bad’ approach—and often these are combined—would have few options
other than to make war or to remain isolated from contact with the DPRK.
Both those options would likely have unacceptable political, humanitarian and
strategic consequences. Less starkly, this perspective leads to a failure of the
imagination in terms of diplomacy. If, for instance ex-US President Jimmy
Carter had really thought nothing could be done with the DPRK in 1994, he
would not have made the visit which helped to break the nuclear deadlock on
the peninsula and helped to prevent war.80
Changing the paradigm?
As Kuhn tells us, changing a dominant paradigm is not easy. First there has to be
an available body of knowledge with alternative assumptions which can absorb
the anomalies thrown up by the ‘old’ paradigm. Second, there must be a crisis
such as to enable a ‘revolution’ in thinking. Below, therefore, I outline the know-
ledge available that could form the basis of a ‘new’ paradigm. I analyse two such
possible paradigms—the ‘sad’ and the ‘rational actor’ perspectives. I conclude by
speculating about the possibilities of revolution in our thinking about the DPRK.
78 Hazel Smith, Policy reforms in the DPRK: limits and opportunities (Rome: World Food Programme, 1999).
79 Noland, ‘Why north Korea will muddle through’, p. 105.
80 See Robert A. Manning, ‘The United States in north Korean foreign policy’, in Kim, ed., North Korean
foreign relations in the post-Cold War era, pp. 153–5.




All in all, given the scale of need found by the humanitarian community, one
way to conceive of the DPRK is as a very ‘sad’ society indeed. All its children
under ten years old have suffered from lack of food and 62 per cent, according
to the surveys, are malnourished.81 An entire generation is growing up in north
Korea damaged physically and mentally by inadequate and insufficient nutrition.
One way to conceive of north Korea, then, would be through a development
studies paradigm. North Korea needs assistance to modernize and integrate itself
within the world economy, and international policy objectives should direct
themselves to this objective. This is what I want to term the ‘sad’ paradigm. The
core of this approach could be located in the studies made by the international
humanitarian community. Commentary by US-based analysis which is shaped
by this ‘developmental’ perspective is already available and is founded on
detailed knowledge of north Korean society obtained by observation of and
engagement with post-1995 DPRK society.82
The ‘rational actor’ thesis
Yet, because there are still real security tensions on the Korean peninsula, we
need to find an interpretative framework for north Korean politics that is
security-conscious but can help analysts differentiate negative from positive
stimulus as far as potential security threats are concerned. The securitization
paradigm cannot do this because, as I have shown, it interprets all DPRK
actions (even those in contradiction with each other) as constituting evidence of
a challenge to international security. By contrast, a useful and standard approach,
but one that has not been utilized in the north Korean case, is Graham Allison’s
‘rational actor model’ of international politics.83 Devised partly to help analyse
the Cuban missile crisis, it posits an interpretative model which suggests that
states (even revolutionary states) can be understood as being led by unitary
governments engaged in more or less purposive acts in international politics.84
Governments, in this model, pursue goals and objectives through choosing
alternative policies and behaviours, to which are attached potential ‘utility’ or
consequences. Rational choice in this scenario consists therefore in selecting
alternatives that maximize utility, that is, which achieve the government’s goals
and minimize unpleasant consequences.
Although this is not the place to extrapolate the model fully, if we take
Allison’s approach as a base we can then explore the utility of interpreting
DPRK behaviour through what I want to qualify as a historicized and
contextualized rational actor framework. This approach assumes that the DPRK,
81 World Food Programme, Nutritional survey of the DPRK (Rome: World Food Programme, undated
[1998]).
82 See Omawale, ‘An exercise in ambivalence’; Williams et al., ‘The wind farm in the cabbage patch’.
83 Graham Allison, Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (London: HarperCollins, 1971).
84 For detailed discussion on the rational actor model see ibid., pp. 10–38.
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as an actor in international relations, is hugely conditioned by its late twentieth-
century experience of war and threats of war and, equally importantly, its sense
of self-directed Korean nationalism. It also assumes an in principle knowable
DPRK even if it acknowledges the real difficulties of researching the country.
This approach has produced some of the most credible literature on north
Korea, much of which is informed by hard empirical observation and some of
which has been cited in this essay as a counterpoint to the more obvious failings
of the dominant paradigm. Bruce Cumings, who has spent many years studying
Korea, is the leader in this field.85
Almost paradoxically, it is the security (as opposed to securitization) literature
where we can see emerging a body of work that argues for a ‘rational actor’
approach to the DPRK. Former New York Times editorial board member Leon
Sigal, for instance, in what has become the standard account of United States
negotiations with north Korea during the 1994 nuclear crisis, shows how Cold
War presumptions of north Korean politics brought the United States to the
brink of war in 1994. War was prevented at literally the last minute by ex-
President Jimmy Carter’s ‘track two’ diplomacy in Pyongyang.86 Carter’s shuttle
diplomacy to the north Korean capital was itself underpinned by personal
intervention from US scholar Selig Harrison, who has persistently argued that
the DPRK is a knowable entity.87
A new research agenda for north Korea could borrow from classical security
studies literature, for instance balance of power theory; but the new security
studies approach which looks at economic instruments as means of achieving
security goals is also relevant.88 Another direction of research could build on
those aspects of Sigal’s work in which he has demonstrated the consistent failure
of US intelligence and foreign policy communities to read what he argues is
both a predictable (and rational in Allison’s sense) negotiating strategy.89 An
alternative agenda might ask the question, for instance, how the north Koreans
achieved what could be considered a diplomatic success in securing a treaty-
based agreement whereby its major adversaries—the United States and south
Korea—would finance the development of its nuclear power programme.90
85 For an accessible and scholarly introduction to Korean politics and society (south and north), see Bruce
Cumings, Korea’s place in the sun (New York: Norton, 1998).
86 Sigal, Disarming strangers. Carter interrupted a White House ‘Council of War’ discussing military action
against the DPRK in a telephone call from Pyongyang outlining the deal that had been agreed with Kim
Il Sung. See ibid., p. 157.
87 See the seminal Selig S. Harrison, ‘Promoting a soft landing in Korea’, Foreign Policy 106, Spring 1997.
88 For a security analysis which avoids the trap of securitization discourse see Christopher W. Hughes,
Japan’s economic power and security: Japan and north Korea (London: Routledge, 1999).
89 Sigal outlines a list of north Korean diplomatic moves as direct and logical responses to US, ROK and
International Atomic Energy Agency actions between 1991 and 1994. See Sigal, Disarming strangers, pp.
257–9.
90 The major source of funding for the new nuclear power reactors is south Korea. Other states including
the US, Japan and the European Union have pledged support. South Korea has agreed some $4 billion
for the actual construction of the light water reactors, although most of the spending will be in the south
on materials and inputs for the north Korean reactors. See Joel Wit, response to policy forum online
(#23B), <NAPSNet@nautilus.orh>, 9 Dec. 1998. Japan has agreed to provide $1 billion to help build
the light water reactors. This funding is by no means certain, as the Japanese government has threatened
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to suspend support as a reaction to DPRK satellite launch over Japanese territory in 1998. See Hughes,
Japan’s economic power and security, pp. 153–4. The United States agreed funding ‘not to exceed’ $35
million. See excerpt from House–Senate Conference report for HR4328 (Omnibus Appropriations Bill),
19 Oct. 1998 Congressional record, obtained from <NAPSNet@nautilus.org>, 29 Oct. 1998.
91 Sigal, Disarming strangers. This is also the message of Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the bomb: a case
study in nonproliferation (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995).
92 Aidan Foster-Carter, ‘North Korea in retrospect’, in Dae Hwan Kim and Tat Yan Kong, eds, The Korean
peninsula in transition (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p. 127.
93 Aidan Foster-Carter, ‘North Korea: all roads lead to collapse—all the more reason to engage Pyongyang’,
in Noland, ed., Economic integration of the Korean peninsula; quote on p. 29. For acknowledgement of the
impact on data availability of ‘famine relief work’ see ibid., p. 30.
More practically, policy-makers need to have available to them accurate
information which can assist in the pursuit of successful negotiating outcomes.
An analysis of the DPRK which attempts the difficult task of sifting through the
evidence to assess and separate out negative and positive signals from Pyongyang
will likely make for more effective and less costly policies than one which
ignores the difference. Such an approach would also allow for the possibility of
cooperation to achieve goals, as opposed to the coercion implied by the
securitization paradigm.91
Crisis and revolution
The dominant paradigm has proved inadequate as a framework from within
which decision-makers could operate in north Korea. It also faces crisis as the
empirical work produced by and through the presence of the humanitarian
community in the DPRK has called into question the rigour and rationality of
the approach. Some signs of a revolution in thinking about the DPRK are
evident, particularly in the ‘sunshine’ policy of the south Korean government.
This policy seeks engagement with the north and is implementing an ambitious
set of policy directions designed to deal with an entity it treats as a rational actor,
motivated by interest and context. There is also some sign of these alternative
assumptions being accepted as more appropriate by those who formerly worked
within the dominant paradigm. In 1992 for instance, one analyst argued that
‘further research…[on north Korea is] impossible under present circum-
stances’.92 By 1998, the same analyst was acknowledging the increasing availability
of data emanating from the humanitarian community as well as admonishing
observers not to treat the DPRK as ‘a strange planet, beyond our ken or
control’.93 The literature provided by the humanitarian community and new
security studies framework provides a solid research base for a revolution in
thinking about the DPRK. Such research can also provide the foundations for
more successful international policy options.
Rational policy options
An obvious rational approach would be to support the south Korean policy of
engagement with north Korea. Another option for US policy-makers would be
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to adopt an approach which is informed by the view that cooperation with
north Korea would serve the US national interest—helping to achieve stability
in East Asia in a way which coercion cannot.
In terms of specific policy proposals, some of the more imaginative being
floated inside the south Korean policy establishments (but outside the dominant
paradigm) are very likely to be greeted by the DPRK with much more of a
willingness to cooperate than is countenanced by the securitization perspective.
For instance, a peace deal which replaced US troops with a peacekeeping force
that included US troops along with other nationalities is a policy position which
could provide a successful way out of the current negotiating impasse at the
four-party talks, if it is approached seriously and constructively. The idea of
including north Korea in a security pact for East Asia along with the United
States, Japan, south Korea and possibly China should be given some serious
thought. If the Pentagon baulks at equal membership of such an East Asian
Pact—as might north Korean generals—an option of associate membership for
north Korea could be sought.
Economically, development organizations could fund small export-oriented
industries (textiles, tourism) in north Korea. Export orientation will of itself
propel north Korea into the terrain of liberal capitalism with its external market
disciplines which inevitably feed back into an already changing north Korean
socio-economic landscape. North Korean business is already much more geared
towards foreign markets—in terms of concerns over quality of goods, meeting
deadlines, etc.—than again is perhaps generally realized by economic analyses
shaped by the securitization lens.
Conclusion
The securitization paradigm provides a poor guide for policy-makers because it
fails to grasp the complexity of north Korean politics and their rapidly changing
nature. An alternative approach would accept a rationality on behalf of the
DPRK and seek to explore the context and motivation for changes in DPRK
policy. Alternative approaches do not have to be normatively committed to
either the continuance or the demise of the north Korean regime. They can,
however, be committed to supporting moves towards peace, stability and
freedom from hunger on the Korean peninsula.
Retaining the dominant approach does not just reflect a crisis of the
diplomatic imagination. Securitizing perspectives shape thought so as to make
coercion the option of choice in dealing with north Korea. In this way
securitization perspectives could well lead to war that would actively involve
China and the United States in direct military conflict with each other. The
choice then is between securitization/war and rationality/diplomatic engage-
ment. Only those who would never set foot upon the Korean peninsula in the
case of a modern war could choose the former.
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